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Due to an (effective) global environmental agreement on climate change becomes less likely in the 
short-term, adaptation to the inevitable consequences of global warming is now getting further 
emphasis. Although adaptation research is rising on the scientific agenda, this interdisciplinary field is 
still characterized by an evolving epistemological base. It is often difficult to operationalize 
theoretical concepts for concrete research design. There is wide recognition that there are crucial 
barriers to adaptation, but a comprehensive set of theories that explain this observation is still not in 
sight. The purpose of this paper is thus twofold. We first want to contribute to the clarification of the 
concept of adaptation in a way that makes theory applicable for designing adaptation assessments. 
Second, we want to supply some new ingredients to the theory of adaptation that allow for the 
systematic construction of meaningful hypotheses about barriers to adaptation from an action-
oriented view. 
There is a broad set of theoretical literature that reflects on the relation between adaptation, 
vulnerability and resilience. We can only mention some examples.  (Brooks, 2003) is careful in 
considering the difference between (actual) adaptation and adaptive capacity (potential adaptation 
that is not necessarily actual). This distinction is underlying much of the literature on vulnerability, 
although it is not always clearly stated. He further differentiates between social and biophysical 
vulnerability. The latter case refers to the consequences of a hazard, while the former is a property of 
the exposed system independently from the hazard event. In this framing, biophysical vulnerability is 
a function of hazard and social vulnerability. Adaptive capacity is the potential to reduce social 
vulnerability by realizing adaptations, that in turn decreases biophysical vulnerability. In a similar 
vein, (O’Brien et al., 2007) distinguish outcome vulnerability and contextual vulnerability. The former 
takes vulnerability as the residual effect of climate change after adaptive responses have been taken. 
Contextual vulnerability puts the exposure unit into the center. Adaptation to climate change can be 
targeted at changing contextual conditions or at reducing damage. Distinctions like this are broadly 
discussed in the literature. The resulting diversity of vulnerability definitions motivates a 
systematization by (Füssel, 2007b). He also argues that the distinction between potential adaptation 
(adaptive capacity) and actual adaptation is needed to reflect the temporal dimension of climate 
change. Adaption is said to rely on information about the vulnerability to climate change. In this 
interpretation, vulnerability is neither partially determined by available adaptation options (which 
would be the case for outcome vulnerability), nor can adaptation change vulnerability (as in 
contextual vulnerability). Also (Kelly & Adger, 2000) (by recurring on Blaikie 1994) distinguish 
between biophysical and social conceptions of vulnerability. They define vulnerability by the ability of 
individuals or social groups to adapt to external stress (p. 328). Note that this refers to potential 
adaptations. They also state that “adaptation is facilitated by reducing vulnerability” (p. 348). Putting 
this together implies the statement that (i) actual adaptation reduces vulnerability, and consequently 
(ii) increases the potential to adapt (a sentence that probably needs to be read twice). (), in contrast, 
try to integrate social and biophysical vulnerability by adopting the perspective of coupled social-
ecological systems. This lets the concept of resilience entering the stage: Similar to the (IPCC, 2001), 
vulnerability is a function of sensitivity, exposure and resilience. The latter is partially determined by 
adaptation and is seen as related to the concept of adaptive capacity. () is a further example for 
linking the adaptation with the resilience discourse. They define adaptation by decision-making 
processes and actions that enhance adaptive capacity. In contrast to this, it is also defined that 
adaptive capacity encompasses the enabling conditions for adaptation. Adaptive capacity is one 
component of resilience. While resilience approaches are oriented toward system properties that 
enable action, actor-oriented approaches mainly view that “adaptation is concerned with actors, 
actions and agency” (p. 398). System characteristics determine adaptation processes that can result 
in adaptedness as outcome. They point out some key areas for research to improve adaptedness, in 
particular the identification of barriers to implementing adaptation and the governance of 
adaptation. Last but not least, (Ionescu et al., 2008) undertake some effort to obtain a very precise 
definition of vulnerability. This sees adaptation as the values of control variables that avoid a system 
from becoming vulnerable. The adaptive capacity is the set of possible values that can be selected as 
adaptations. The literature that tries to disentangle these different interpretations of vulnerability is 
quite complex, and some of the above authors critically reflect on whether this effort is indeed 
productive. The complexity of concepts, to our opinion, arises from the difficulties with keeping 
potential and actual action apart, and with the sometimes unclear descriptive or prescriptive 
research motivation. We argue that it would be more helpful to concentrate on the basic ingredient 
of this discourse: adaptations as singular actions that are exercised by actors. Being more decent in 
this respect might be more clear-cut and productive. 
There are other alternative approaches that are more decision-oriented. Although (Burton et al., 
2002) and (Lim & Spanger-Siegfried, 2004) see a prominent role of the vulnerability concept, they 
give it an instrumental, “subordinate” role. Instead, they consider the design of adaptation 
assessments. In accordance with the (IPCC, 2007), they distinguish autonomous adaptation, being a 
component of vulnerability, and planned adaptation targeted at reducing impacts of climate change 
or reducing vulnerability. Vulnerability is a function of exposure, sensitivity and adaptive capacity. 
Adaptation comes more to the center of the proposed framework because there have always been 
adaptations to climatic conditions that offer a starting point for identifying specific adaptations to 
deal with climate change. () analyze in their seminal paper the following crucial components of 
adaptation. First, climate disturbances that affect a system under consideration provide the reason 
for adaptation. Both the characteristics of the biophysical disturbance and of the affected system are 
relevant for adaptation. Adaption is a response to climate change, that can be environmental change 
or human action. The latter can i.a. be distinguished by the intentions of the action (e.g. purposefully 
or only incidentally addressing climate change) and by actor type (e.g. public or private). A similar 
analysis is provided by (Smit et al., 2000). They pose four core questions. “Adaptation to what?” 
refers to climate-related stimuli that affect a “sensitive system” or “exposure unit”. The exposure 
unit and its characteristics are specified by answering “who or what adapts?”. An exposure unit can 
both be a biophysical or social entity. It is acknowledged in a short note “… that ‘who’ and ‘what’ are 
not necessarily synonymous. For example, actions by forest managers (who) may result in 
adaptations in a forest (what)” (p. 236), but that relation is not further investigated. The third 
question, “how does adaptation occur?”, refers to some classifications that take a descriptive view 
on adaptation (e.g. (Carter et al., 1994)), in particular the intent, timing, localization and type of 
measures. Finally, “how good is the adaptation?” requires the evaluation of measures. These 
contributions provide a good basis for understanding adaptation and propose some crucial variables 
for adaptation theory. They are, however, less comprehensive in drawing conclusions for the 
governance of adaptations. One starting point could be to further refine the role of the systems or 
actor that adapt, and to refine the concepts about the process of adaptation. Although several 
papers informally characterize adaptations as “actions”, there is little work that explicitly exploits this 
framing. (Pelling & High, 2005) consider social capital as a determinant of adaptive capacity. They 
categorize adaptive interventions by being material or institutional, and by being purposeful or 
incidental. (Bohle, 2001) shortly mentions a role for action-oriented approaches to adaptation with a 
reference to Giddens’ relationship between structure and agency. This allows to analyze how means 
and ends of adaptations are interlinked. (Jetzkowitz, 2007) explores, with reference to Parsons, the 
norms and conditions that shape adaptive action in a particular application to tourism. 
Our paper takes up this thread by expanding the analysis of (Eisenack, 2009). We will detail out the 
questions “who or what adapts?” and “how does adaptation occur?” by framing adaptation as 
(collective) action. In doing so, we will refrain from using the difficult terms “vulnerability” and 
“adaptive capacity”. By referring to established theories of action we want to clarify the meaning of 
adaptation in an applicable way and to derive potential barriers to adaptation. This should help to 
design adaptation policies or instruments. We thus restrict ourselves to adaptations that are 
exercised by human actors. 
2 An Action Theory of Adaptation 
 
This section first introduces the basic ingredients of the action theory of adaptation and then relates 
them to other theories. Some examples to illustrate concepts are taken from (Stecker et al., 2010), 
(Eisenack et al., 2010) and (Eisenack, 2009). 
 
2.1 Core Concepts 
 
The IPCC definitions and the analysis of (Smit et al., 2000) motivate adaptation by (potential) 
environmental stimuli that affect given entities, subjects or systems. Adaptations are processes of 
entities and systems, or adjustments of human systems. In our approach we are more specific by 
referring only to human systems, individuals and collective actors. This lends to the following outline 
of the action theory that can partially be built around established concepts (see Fig. 1). Action 
requires actors and an intention. The intention is directed towards an impact of climate change. 
Furthermore, adaptations require the use of resources as means to achieve the intended ends. This 
outline will be detailed and qualified in the following. 
 
 
Fig. 1: Schematic representation of some core concepts of the action theory of adaptation. Exposure 
unit, receptor and operator can be actors. They are not necessarily identical. (Further explanations in 
the text.) 
 
A stimulus is a change of biophysical (in particular meteorological) variables triggered by climate 
change. In a very precise meaning, this has to be distinguished from weather events. Stimuli refer to 
new statistical properties as averages intensity, higher momenta, or frequencies. They can also refer 
to abrupt large-scale events in the earth system. In many practical cases it is yet not relevant to insist 
on this distinction. There is also a difference between meteorological effects as temperature and 
precipitation patterns on the one hand, and more or less indirect effects as sea level rise or a 
changed frequency of river floods (we further discuss this issue below). 
A stimulus is only relevant for adaptation when it influences an exposure unit. The latter term 
broadly refers to all those actors, social, technical or non-human systems that depend on climatic 
conditions, and are therefore exposed to stimuli. The abstract term is necessary to encompass the 
broad diversity of affected entities or systems that may be considered in an adaptation study. 
Although we are concerned with an action theory here, we explicitly do not restrict exposure units to 
human systems. 
By an impact of climate change we understand a combination of a stimulus and an exposure unit. 
More broadly, it can be a set of stimuli with an associated set of exposure unit. For example, a 
reduced energy production of a thermal power plant (exposure unit) due to more frequent scarcity 
of cooling water (stimulus) is an impact. This is not a quantitative definition, e.g. in terms of a 
damage measure. Such a measure is not needed in the following, but might be a relevant extension. 
In the following we want to illustrate the different concepts with an example for an adaptation. 
Consider a public early warning system that informs about upcoming extreme weather conditions 
(say, heavy rain) that bear risk for using specific transport modes (e.g. travelling by car, bicycle or by 
foot). This adaptation may be motivated by the impact of more frequent precipitation extremes (the 
stimulus) on transport safety. The exposure units are users of the mentioned transportation modes.  
In the DPSIR-Framework (OECD, 1993, EEA, 1999), the stimulus refers to the state (S). An adaptation 
is the social response by an individual, as set of individuals or an organization in the broadest sense. 
The (collective) actor that exercises the response is called the operator. We need this distinct term, 
since actors will also play other roles in this theory (see below). An operator can thus be, e.g. a 
private household, a firm or a government. But it needs to be social entity, so that machines, artifacts 
and natural systems are ruled out to be an operator. 
Not all activities of an operator are actions. Only those activities with a purpose qualify for this term. 
The operator tries to achieve intended ends that are associated with (other) actors, social or non-
human systems. The ends are ultimately targeted at impacts (see below for a further discussion of 
this statement). 
The actor or system that is addressed by the purpose of an adaptation is called the receptor. 
Receptors can be both biophysical entities (e.g. the crops of a famer) and social systems (e.g. the 
farmer household), depending on the objective of analysis. It is further not required that the receptor 
of an adaptation is an exposure unit at the same time. This is a crucial point as will become clear in 
what follows. 
We illustrate this with the early warning system example. The operator is a public body that runs the 
system. It collects weather forecast and transmits them to the public in an accessible way. The 
purpose of that adaptation is to reduce harm to individual transport users (that might use other 
modes of transportation or avoid travelling in the case of a warning). The intention is to change 
behaviour of transport users, making them the receptors. The public body is not the relevant 
exposure unit (it is not affected by heavy rain), but the receptors of the early warning system are 
exposure units. 
The emphasis of the purpose begs a comment. There are, of course, many social phenomena that do 
not follow a purpose. In this case, we do not call them actions, but mere processes. Processes are 
sequences of events in time that may occur to a biophysical, technical or social entity or system. They 
can be framed as linked through causality or in a mechanistic way. Actions are a special case of social 
processes that additionally have a teleological component (cf. (Weber, 1922) and the discussion in 
the next section).  
To exercise the adaptation, the operator needs resources, called means. This can be access to 
financial or other material resources, legal power, social networks, knowledge and availability of 
information. Action is further shaped by constraints and resources that cannot be controlled by the 
operator. These are called the conditions (cf. (Parsons, 1937), see next section). 
In the example, the primary means employed by the operator of the early warning system are the 
information that is provided to the receptors. Further means involved are the public funding and the 
education of the people running the system, but these are not channeled to the transport users. 
Examples for conditions are the attitudes of the receptors toward the early warning system (Do they 
actually listen to the forecasts? Do they trust the forecasts? Does information lead to behavior 
change?) and the legal context for the operator (Is there a stable funding? Are operators liable for 
wrong forecasts?). 
It is helpful to further differentiate three notions of means: available means, employed means and 
necessary means. Available means are those that are disposable by the operator, while the employed 
means is that part that is actually used for a specific adaptation. That does not imply that the 
adaptation is effective, since success requires the use of the necessary means – these might be 
available or not. It is important to note that these three types of means are not compulsory identical. 
In the early warning system, there is probably the capacity to provide more detailed information 
(available means) than is currently done (employed means). However, the conditions of the transport 
users, e.g. missing willingness to draw attention to the warnings, may additionally require the 
temporary closure of certain roads to achieve the desired effect – other means than just information 
are necessary. 
2.2 Complex Concepts 
 
Based on the above concepts, further crucial characterizations can be made. 
The most straightforward adaptations might be those where the receptor is an exposure unit at the 
same time: the purpose of the action is to improve the situation of a system that is affected by a 
climate stimulus. We may call this direct adaptation. In contrast, it may also be meaningful to 
consider actions where receptor and exposure unit are not identical. Then, adaptations are 
instrumental in the sense that the action might enable the receptor to take further measures, and 
only these are finally targeted to an exposure unit. It might be necessary to provide an actor with 
resources such that she has enough available means.  The early warning system is a direct 
adaptation, since the receptors of the information are the transport users that are exposed to the 
weather. An instrumental adaptation would be, for example, an internal reform of the system to 
improve its quality. This action is only indirectly targeted at the exposure units. A distinction between 
direct and instrumental adaptation has some similarity to the difference between material and 
institutional intervention (Pelling & High, 2005). 
Also operators and receptors do not need to be identical. When operators act with the purpose to 
change something for other actors or biophysical systems, this is called a facilitating adaptation (cf. 
(Hinkel, 2007)). If the purpose of the operator is to change something for herself, we can call this a 
reflexive adaptation. The early warning system is a facilitating adaptation, since it is distinct from the 
transport users (the receptors of the adaptation). 
More closely investigating the case of the early warning system shows that the public body for 
information provision was set up by a political administration. This is a further adaptation that can be 
distinguished from the early warning system itself. But the operator is now the political 
administration, employing legal means and financial resources for implementing the public body, 
that now has the role of a receptor. The stimulus and the exposure units that motivate the 
adaptation are the same as before, but not distinct from both operator and receptor. The action of 
the political administration is thus an instrumental and facilitating adaptation. It is intuitive to see 
that the roles of operators, receptors and exposure units may be combined in very different ways. 
One might object that by admitting instrumental and facilitating adaptations nearly every action can 
be classified as an adaptation, since it is not required that adaptations improve the situation of an 
exposure unit towards a stimulus from climate change. Depending on the objective of research we 
might narrowly consider only direct adaptations, since only those obviously affect exposure units. 
The relevance of instrumental and of facilitating adaptations yet illustrates a basic property of social 
actions: means and ends tend to come in chains where the effect of one action is the pre-condition 
for another one. It might thus be practicable to consider (again depending on the research objective) 
only those adaptations where at least one means-end chain ends up in an exposure unit. This is, by 
the way, structurally similar to cause-effect-chains that might link direct and indirect impacts. Also 
here it depends on the boundaries of analysis whether only first and second order stimuli are 
considered (e.g. precipitation change or sea level rise), or also higher order stimuli (e.g. coastal 
flooding, closed harbor due to flooding, economic losses due to close harbors etc.). 
A further distinction relates to the purpose of adaptation and a probably missing (ultimate) exposure 
unit. The literature already considers purposeful and incidental adaptations (Pelling & High, 2005). 
There a many actions that are not explicitly termed as adaptation, but nevertheless have strong 
(harmful or beneficial) side effects with respect to consequences of climate change. The purpose of 
such actions is not linked to any exposure units, not directly and also not instrumentally. It might be, 
however, that by interpreting the action just as a process it has a beneficial influence on an exposure 
unit with respect to a stimulus. It is an adapting process that the operator is not aware of. We 
propose to call the latter implicit adaptation, while the more straightforward case is denoted as 
explicit adaptation.  Should actions that are only implicitly linked to exposure units be regarded as 
adaptations at all? The decision again depends on the research objectives. 
2.3 Theoretical Background 
 
For the core concepts of the action theory of adaptation it is not sufficient to consider social 
processes alone, as might be appropriate for a purely sociological issue. For investigating adaptation 
to climate change, we need to discuss the relation of actions beyond social processes and actions, 
since the interlinkages to the natural environment are crucial. We have to deal with an 
interdisciplinary problem of interlinked bio-physical and socio-economic systems. One of the 
straightforward options is the link to the Driver-Pressure-State-Impact-Response-Framework as 
already indicated above (DPSIR). The consequences of climate change are described according to the 
concepts of stimulus, impact, exposure unit, and response. The DPSIR framework is not without 
criticism, in particular due to the very ‘linear’ model it suggests. We nevertheless think it to be a good 
starting point for the action theory, because we only adopt that part of the framework that is 
structured by biophysical causality. Our approach remains compatible with conceptions of contextual 
vulnerability ((O’Brien et al., 2007), see introduction), since it is possible to focus on the means and 
conditions for operators independently from the actual occurrence of stimuli.  
The definition of action as being the subset of social processes (‘acts’) that are associated with 
intention is established in analytical philosophy (e.g. (Wilson, 2008)). The further terminology is 
rooted in the “action frame of reference” (Parsons, 1937), that analyses actions by the actor, the 
ends, the situation, and the mode of relationship between these elements. The situation is 
decomposed into the conditions, referring to those elements the actor cannot control, and the 
means, which can be controlled. Action is further shaped by norms and values (not discussed in our 
theory yet). The ends of actions can be made more specific for our purpose, since they are directly or 
indirectly targeted at actors or systems that are influenced by changes in climatic conditions. 
Parson’s action theory is not without criticism. With its focus on norms and values, it has been 
accused for being politically conservative by disregarding changing conditions. The action frame of 
reference is yet only one conceptual base of this theory. It is an established reference point for 
discussing alternative action theories. 
3 Applications 
3.1 Barriers to Adaptation 
 
By combining the implication of the introduced concepts we can identify likely reasons that might 
limit the implementation of adaptations. It is, of course, an empirical matter of one or more of the 
following barriers to adaptation apply in a specific case. We nevertheless expect from the action 
theory of adaptation that it likely that these barriers will appear quite often. These barriers may be 
compared against those generally proposed by (Füssel, 2007a), and by the economic analysis of 
(Lecocq & Shalizi, 2007): 
 There is no operator due to complete ignorance of impacts. In this case, not even the 
necessary means for adaptation are known. Although there might may be a vague problem 
awareness, adaptation is hindered on the base of missing means in terms of individual 
knowledge about impacts or due to conditions that prohibit problem awareness (e.g. high 
information costs, social habits and normative standards). This hinders adaptation although 
action is not constrained by limited available means. 
 The necessary means are not available although there is an operator. Although there is no 
lack of perceived problem urgency (e.g. by exposure units themself), capacity or budget 
constraints hinder appropriate adaptation. This is crucial, in particular, for many developing 
countries that are disproportionally exposed to climate change and already have limited 
capacities to cope with other severe stresses. In the worst case, missing adaptation due to 
unavailable means might result in poverty traps. Another variant are missing responsibilities, 
when motivated operators do not have the legal power to act. 
 Means are not sufficiently employed although there is an operator to whom the necessary 
means are available. When an adaptation has positive externalities for other actors, the 
operator may choose to under-adapt when he gets no contributing means of other exposure 
units. By symmetry, it might also be the case that the operator over-adapts when the action 
has negative effects on other exposure units. There are also perverse moral hazard situations 
where means are employed to increase the consequences of impacts. In many cases 
settlements are (re)built in high risk areas (e.g. due to flooding). Investors (exposure units) 
push planning decisions towards their own favour, since they expect compensation from the 
public (as operator) in the case of a disaster. In sum, this type of barrier refers to misaligned 
incentives in the economic analysis. 
 The network of exposure units, operators and receptors is too complex to come to decisions. 
Since climate change has very diverse effects which are relevant for many exposure units in 
different ways, there are likely to be many decision conflicts. This might be amplified by 
established institutional arrangements that are not tailored to the new type of adaptation 
challenge. (Reckien et al., 2008) shows how different actor types can be entangled for 
adaptation in the transport sector. For new problems it is not always ex ante clear which the 
relevant actors are. Economically speaking, all these problems raise the transaction costs of 
information search, monitoring and contract enforcement. This inhibits the necessary means 
from being employed. 
3.2 Analyzing other Concepts 
 
We finally want to demonstrate how the action theory of adaptation links to some other established 
concepts of adaptation and vulnerability research. 
The authors of the IPCC distinguish between autonomous and planned adaptation (IPCC, 2007). The 
precise meaning is not as clear as it first seems. (Füssel, 2007a) claims that planned adaptation refers 
to the usage of information about future conditions. We do not think that this is the underlying 
difference. Ecological changes in natural systems are typically considered as autonomous, while 
government programs are planned. There are thus at least two further interpretations. It might be 
the difference between adaptations as actions (as seen in this paper) and mere processes that lead 
improvements. Alternatively, the term “planned adaptation” refers to the type of operator, i.e. it is 
an actor category. Even when just processes considering, there is a broad spectrum of relevant 
entities between biophysical entities and governments, e.g. technical infrastructure, companies, 
markets, local authorities, educational institutions or NGOs. Where is the appropriate line to 
distinguish between planned and autonomous. One should at least be specific about that in a 
concrete research context. 
Of similar prominence is the distinction of anticipatory and reactive adaptation (e.g. (IPCC, 2007)). It 
is often specified by the temporal dimensions of adaptations (e.g. (Smit et al., 2000, Füssel, 2007b)). 
We think that the core of the distinction is the question of whether to take action in advance. How 
can this be rooted in the action theory? One interpretation relates to the purpose of action that 
might lie in the future (cf. (Füssel, 2007a)). For some adaptations there is a substantial time lag 
between employing the means for the adaptation and its effect. Then, an adaptation is reactive 
when it is meant to become realized in the present, while it is anticipatory when it is planned to 
come into effect only in the future. Alternatively, the distinction can be based on the means available 
to the operator, in particular only knowledge about the present and the past (reactive), or also 
assumptions about the future, e.g. from climate projections or scenarios (anticipatory)? Finally, 
adaptation can also be anticipatory in the sense of expectations about means that are available in 
the future. These two interpretations are not equivalent. Adaptations that are reactive in the means-
sense are likely also to be reactive in the purpose-sense as well, since in most cases actions that are 
planned to take effect in the future will take assumptions about the future into account. In contrast, 
it is not unlikely that actions which are reactive in the purpose-sense are based on anticipatory 
assumptions about the future. Of course, adaptations can also be anticipatory in both senses. This 
discussion supports the claim that the often made distinction between anticipatory and reactive 
adaptation is everything else but clear. 
A classic IPCC typology of adaptations is provided by (Carter et al., 1994). They differentiate 
infrastructural, legal and legislative, institutional, administrative, organizational, regulatory, financial, 
research and development, market mechanisms and technological adaptations. This are basically 
means categories, that may also be associated with typical operator types. 
By construction, many terms of action theory of adaptation can be mapped to the clarifying 
questions of (Smit et al., 2000). “Adaptation to what?” characterizes the purpose of an adaptation in 
terms of an impact, i.e. a stimulus that affects a considered exposure unit. “Who or what adapts?” 
asks for the operator, receptor, and their relation to the exposure unit. Finally, “how does adaptation 
occur?” requires a description on how means and purpose are interlinked, and whether just 
processes, or even actions are considered. 
We finally want to try our best in shedding light on the difficulties with defining vulnerability and 
adaptive capacity as laid out in the introduction. When adaptive capacity refers to potential 
adaptation, it might be, in the simplest case, a measure for the available means. However, since we 
have seen that the available means are not likely to complete explain the implementation of 
adaptations, adaptive refers to conditions as well. In any case we avoid confusion between the 
statement that adaptive capacity enables adaptation on the one hand, and the statement that 
adaptations reducing vulnerability on the other hand. In the first statement, adaptive capacity 
considers means and conditions, while the second statement talks about facilitating adaptations 
where the operator is distinct from the receptor (the vulnerable system). 
4 Conclusions 
 
This paper presents a theory to analyze adaptation from an action-oriented perspective. It reveals 
potential barriers to adaptation and provides a terminology to clarify different types of adaptation. 
In this terminology one could define adaptations as individual or collective actions that are explicitly 
or implicitly intended to affect impacts from climate change, or that are instrumental for achieving 
this end.  This is yet just one possible definition with the terms introduced by the action theory of 
adaptation. It leaves it partially open what is to be considered as an adaptation. Depending on the 
research design or on practical questions it may be useful only to consider, e.g., direct or reflexive 
adaptations. We argue, however, that the theory can be fruitfully used to make precise statements 
about what adaptation processes are considered in a concrete context. The theory further makes 
explicit statements about crucial variables to understand adaptation 
Further applications could exploit the terminology of the operator, receptor and exposure unit to 
map more complex actor networks. This could be the basis for understanding conflicts between 
different actors resulting of adaptation, or to measure transaction costs associated with the 
coordination of multiple actors in adaptation policies.  The theory can also be used to classify and 
systematize collections of adaptations (as in, e.g. (UKCIP, 2007), see (Eisenack et al., 2010) for such 
an application of the action theory).  There is also room for interesting extensions. Parson’s action 
theory gives a prominent role to the norms and values that shape social action. This is currently not 
discussed in the action theory of adaptation, but could – together with investigating available means 
for and conditions of action – improve the analysis of the institutional dimensions of adaptation. 
Finally, the important role of uncertainty in adaptation could make a more explicit consideration of 
the perceptions and beliefs of actors promising. 
 One difficulty is that the approach taken by the action theory of adaptation is very analytic in the 
following sense. Already Parson’s action frame of reference (1937) is meant to analyze a unit act. This 
bear the notion of an “atomistic” action unit into which all more complex actions can be 
decomposed. “Simple” adaptations may be part of more “comprehensive” adaptations. Indeed, 
carefully investigating prima facie single adaptations in that terminology is likely to leads to a broad 
decomposed bundle of “atomistic” adaptations that are linked together in a kind of “molecule”. 
Similar problems are known in the literature on policy classification (cf. (Steinberger, 1980)): policies 
are difficult to delinate (when does a policy begin and end in time?, where does it enter the domain 
of another policy?, etc.), and classification schemes are known to depend on the frame of reference. 
We nevertheless have the impression, that that the proposed theory of adaptation is a helpful device 
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